9 research outputs found
PKI Scalability Issues
This report surveys different PKI technologies such as PKIX and SPKI and the
issues of PKI that affect scalability. Much focus is spent on certificate
revocation methodologies and status verification systems such as CRLs,
Delta-CRLs, CRS, Certificate Revocation Trees, Windowed Certificate Revocation,
OCSP, SCVP and DVCS.Comment: 23 pages, 2 figure
Sharing Computer Network Logs for Security and Privacy: A Motivation for New Methodologies of Anonymization
Logs are one of the most fundamental resources to any security professional.
It is widely recognized by the government and industry that it is both
beneficial and desirable to share logs for the purpose of security research.
However, the sharing is not happening or not to the degree or magnitude that is
desired. Organizations are reluctant to share logs because of the risk of
exposing sensitive information to potential attackers. We believe this
reluctance remains high because current anonymization techniques are weak and
one-size-fits-all--or better put, one size tries to fit all. We must develop
standards and make anonymization available at varying levels, striking a
balance between privacy and utility. Organizations have different needs and
trust other organizations to different degrees. They must be able to map
multiple anonymization levels with defined risks to the trust levels they share
with (would-be) receivers. It is not until there are industry standards for
multiple levels of anonymization that we will be able to move forward and
achieve the goal of widespread sharing of logs for security researchers.Comment: 17 pages, 1 figur
Known-Plaintext Attack Against a Permutation Based Video
One of the approaches to deliver real-time video encryption is to apply permutations to the bytes within a frame of a fully encoded MPEG stream as presented in [2]. We demonstrate that this particular algorithm is vulnerable to a known-plaintext attack, and hence its use should be carefully considered. We also discuss modifications that can make the algorithm resistant to our attack
Preserving Both Privacy and Utility in Network Trace Anonymization
As network security monitoring grows more sophisticated, there is an
increasing need for outsourcing such tasks to third-party analysts. However,
organizations are usually reluctant to share their network traces due to
privacy concerns over sensitive information, e.g., network and system
configuration, which may potentially be exploited for attacks. In cases where
data owners are convinced to share their network traces, the data are typically
subjected to certain anonymization techniques, e.g., CryptoPAn, which replaces
real IP addresses with prefix-preserving pseudonyms. However, most such
techniques either are vulnerable to adversaries with prior knowledge about some
network flows in the traces, or require heavy data sanitization or
perturbation, both of which may result in a significant loss of data utility.
In this paper, we aim to preserve both privacy and utility through shifting the
trade-off from between privacy and utility to between privacy and computational
cost. The key idea is for the analysts to generate and analyze multiple
anonymized views of the original network traces; those views are designed to be
sufficiently indistinguishable even to adversaries armed with prior knowledge,
which preserves the privacy, whereas one of the views will yield true analysis
results privately retrieved by the data owner, which preserves the utility. We
present the general approach and instantiate it based on CryptoPAn. We formally
analyze the privacy of our solution and experimentally evaluate it using real
network traces provided by a major ISP. The results show that our approach can
significantly reduce the level of information leakage (e.g., less than 1\% of
the information leaked by CryptoPAn) with comparable utility
Sharing Network Logs for Computer Forensics: A New Tool for the Anonymization of NetFlow Records
this paper is really about the implementation and performance of the system. As such, the results of [4] can be applied to [1], [2
Future Internet Security Services Enabled by Sharing of Anonymized Logs
As security monitoring grows both more complicated and more sophisticated, there is an increased demand for outsourcing these tasks for to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs). However, the core problem of sharing private data creates a barrier to the widespread adoption of this business model. In this position paper we propose an anonymization solution that promotes sharing logs with MSSPs while simultaneously protecting privacy
Future Internet Security Services Enabled by Sharing of Anonymized Logs
Abstract. As security monitoring grows more complicated, there is an increased demand for outsourcing these tasks for to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs). However, the core problem of sharing private data creates a barrier to the widespread adoption of this business model. In this position paper we propose an anonymization solution that promotes sharing logs with MSSPs while simultaneously protecting privacy.